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Abstract: This paper examines how mandatory CSR information disclosure affects corporate green 
innovation. The analysis exploits China’s mandate in 2008 which requires firms to disclose CSR 
activities, and uses a difference-in-difference method to do the empirical analysis. The results reveal 
that the treat firms exhibit an increase in green innovation subsequent to the mandate which supports 
Porter’s hypothesis with the positive role of environmental regulations. On average, after the policy 
implementation, the firms in the list generate 2.193–2.244 more green invention patents than those if 
not in the list. In addition, the impact of mandatory CSR disclosure is heterogeneous on different types 
of firms. Firms with large size, state-owned firms and firms in pollution-intensive industries are more 
likely to be affected by mandate, which suggests that these firms are more sensitive to the mandatory 
information disclosure. 
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1. Introduction 
The famous Berle-Dodd debate has aroused people’s attention to corporate social responsibility 
(hereafter called CSR). They discussed who the firms should be responsible for. Berle’s view is that 
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firms should be seen only as the maximizers of shareholders’ value. Dodd’s view supports the notion 
that firms should be accountable to stakeholders and the general public. Nowadays, it is generally 
believed that CSR includes responsibilities to employees, creditors, consumers, social welfare, 
environment and resources. In other words, CSR is the responsibility to stakeholders, not just to 
shareholders. Most scholars have focused on the responsibility of firms to shareholders, and they have 
studied the relationship between CSR and corporate performance (El Ghoul et al., 2011; McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2000; Deng et al., 2013). This paper focuses on the responsibility for the environment and 
resources and tries to determine the impact of CSR on green innovation. 
Is it necessary to implement the policy of mandatory CSR information disclosure? Research 
shows that CSR information disclosure can reduce financing costs and ease information symmetry (Xu 
et al., 2019). For firms with high capital cost, voluntary CSR information disclosure will be carried 
out to reduce capital cost. CSR information disclosure can also attract institutional investors’ 
investment by attracting analysts’ attention and reducing the analysis forecast error (Dhaliwal et al., 
2012; Dhaliwal et al., 2011), CSR information disclosure is conducive to improving firm value 
(Plumlee et al., 2015; Dai et al., 2019). However, also scholars have found that CSR information 
disclosure may reduce corporate profits, reduce industrial wastewater and sulfur dioxide emissions, 
and improve corporate environmental performance (Chen et al., 2018; Ren et al., 2020). The reason 
for these controversial issues may be that the samples are different. The former mainly studies the 
effect of CSR information disclosure which may be faced with self-selection problems, that firms with 
more CSR information disclosure are usually faced with higher financing cost. While the latter studies 
the effect of mandatory CSR information disclosure, which is exogenous and can avoid the endogenous 
problems caused by self-selection. 
In 2008, Shanghai Stock Exchange, along with Shenzhen Stock Exchange, issued a notice on 
mandatory CSR information disclosure. Based on this quasi natural experiment, this paper adopts the 
difference-in-difference method, and concludes that CSR information disclosure can promote green 
innovation. On average, after the implementation of the policy, the firms on the list have 1.912–1.956 
more green development patent applications than those not on the list. Furthermore, this paper studies 
the impact of heterogeneity on different types of firms. State owned firms and large-scale firms are 
more likely to be affected by policies. On average, the number of green invention patent applications 
of state-owned firms in the list is 2.44 more than that of state-owned firms if not in the list, and the 
number of green invention patent applications of large-scale firms in the list is 2.81 more than that of 
large-scale firms if not in the list. In addition, this paper also found that pollution intensive firms are 
more likely to be affected by the policy. The pollution intensive firms in the list have 6.98 green 
invention patent applications than those if not in the list. 
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, we examine the impact of mandatory 
CSR information disclosure on green innovation. Since the Berle-Dodd debate, there have been a large 
number of studies on the effect of CSR information disclosure. Research shows that CSR information 
disclosure can reduce financing costs and also produce social effects, such as reducing environmental 
pollution (Chen et al., 2018). However, few scholars have studied the impact of CSR information 
disclosure on corporate micro behavior, especially on corporate innovation behavior. Our paper 
complements contemporaneous research by Chen et al. (2018). The authors use the DID method to 
analyze the how mandatory CSR disclosure impacts firm performance and social externalities. This 
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paper also adopts the DID method to study how mandatory CSR information disclosure affect corporate 
green innovation behavior. Secondly, we also supplement the research about the impact of environmental 
regulation on green innovation. Guo et al. (2018) argue that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between environmental regulation and green technology innovation, and China is on the left side of the 
inflection point, that is, China’s environmental regulation is conducive to technological innovation This 
paper supports the conclusion of Guo et al. (2018), and concludes that as an environmental regulation 
policy, the introduction of mandatory CSR information disclosure policy is conducive to promoting firms’ 
green innovation. It also verifies Porter’s hypothesis: environmental regulation can affect the level of 
firms’ performance by strengthening the degree of innovation and competition (Porter and Vanderlinde, 
1995). Finally, we examine the heterogeneous effect of mandatory CSR information disclosure on green 
innovation. Schumpeter hypothesis holds that the innovation level of large firms is higher than small and 
medium-sized firms. This paper supports this conclusion. Compared with small and medium-sized firms, 
the green innovation level of large-scale firms is significantly improved after the introduction of the 
policy, while the green innovation level of small and medium-sized firms has no significant change. 
State-owned firms are more likely to attract investors’ attention, so they should be sensitive to the 
mandatory CSR information disclosure policy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, and put up with 
our hypotheses. Section 3 is the research design, and describes the data and methods. Section 4 firstly 
investigates the effect of mandatory CSR information disclosure on green innovation, then analyzes the 
heterogeneous effects between state-owned firms with non-state-owned firms, large firms with small and 
medium-sized firm. Section 5 uses the PSM-DID method to do the robust tests. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1. Literature review  
2.1.1. CSR, techonogical innovation and performance 
The Berle-Dodd debate has attracted scholars’ attention to CSR (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012; 
Tapver, 2019). Earlier studies focused on whether CSR can increase firm performance. However, there 
is no consensus about the the effect of CSR information disclosure on firm’s performance. The positive 
view argue that CSR information disclosure can provide incremental information, so it has a positive 
impact on the firm’s economic performance (Reverte et al., 2016; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson 
et al., 2013; Fan et al., 2020; Haque et al., 2019). While the opposing view suggests that firms’ 
objective functions are to generate profits and any managerial involvement in CSR activities is rather 
a barrier to the accomplishment of the profit maximizing purpose. Investing in CSR activities is likely 
to reduce a firm’s capital and other critical resouces, so CSR distorts capital allocation efficiency 
(Bhandari and Javakhadze, 2017). Environmental information disclosure consumes the firm’s limited 
resources so that it has a negative impact on the firm’s economic performance (Ren et al., 2020). 
Furthermore, Denis & Michel concludes that there is insignificant relation between environmental 
information disclosure and firm value (Marshall et al., 2009). 
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Later studies argues that CSR may have a indirect effect on firm’s perfomance through the 
innovation. Several studies contend that CSR and R&D are highly correlated (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2000, 2011) and that the indirect effect of CSR activities to firms’ performance comes through the 
enhancement of firms’ R&D efforts (Broadstock et al., 2019; Lioui and Sharma, 2012). Simpson and 
Tamayo (2020) documents that increased disclosure and better financial reporting can foster 
innovation. Li et al. (2019) argues that corporate environmental responsibility can affect firm value 
with innovation as a mediating role. Furthermore, CSR information disclosure can alleviate the 
information asymmetry between managers and investors, controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, and alleviate the financing constraint problems, thereby improving innovation 
sustainability (Hu et al., 2020). However, Bocquet et al. explores the relationship between CSR and 
innovation from a firm strategic perspective, they conclude that firms with strategic CSR profiles are 
more likely to innovate in both products and processes. In contrast, adopting responsive CSR practices 
may create barriers to innovation (Bocquet et al., 2013).  
2.1.2. The heterogeneous effects of mandatory CSR information disclosure 
Firms have also become increasingly willing to voluntarily issue standalone CSR reports in recent 
years. Large numbers of studies have proved that greater CSR information disclosure could reduce the 
capital cost (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 
1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Firms with a high cost of capital in the previous year tend to initiate 
disclosure of CSR activities in the current year (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). But these results may not apply 
to the mandatory CSR information disclosure.  
To our knowledge, there is little evidence investigating the heterogeneous effects of mandatory 
CSR information disclosure. One exception is the research of Chen et al. (2018), who argues that after 
the mandatory CSR disclosure the firms experience a decrease in sales revenue and an increase in 
operating costs, leading to a decrease in profitability. A second exception is the study by Grewal et al. 
(2019), who investigates the equity market reaction to events associated with the adoption of 
mandatory nonfinancial disclosure. To explore the impact of mandatory CSR information disclosure 
on green innovation can supplement the research in this area. 
2.1.3. Environmental regulation and green innovation 
This paper also aligns with Porter’s hypothesis which suggests that environmental regulation has 
a positive effect on firms’ performance levels through the enhancement of innovation and 
competitiveness (Porter and Vanderlinde, 1995; Porter, 1991; Adjei Kwakwa et al., 2018). Restricting 
to environmental innovation, a series of literature find a positive relationship with environmental 
regulation (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Lanoie et al., 2011; Popp, 2003, 2006), even Li et al. (2018) 
construct a model to prove the effectivities of green loan and government subsidy on promoting green 
innovation (Li et al., 2018). Furthermore, Johnstone et al. examine not only the impact of the stringency 
of environmental policies, but also the impact of their stability and flexibility, and find that both 
stability and flexibility have distinct effects on innovation (Johnstone et al., 2009). In order to explore 
the applicability of porter hypothesis in China, Zhao and Sun do an empirical study to explore this 
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mechanism by using Chinese pollution-intensive, and results show that environmental regulation has 
significant positive effects on corporation’s innovation (Zhao and Sun, 2016). 
But the results of many studies still cannot be explained by the Porter hypothesis. For example, 
Jaffe and Palmer document that environmental regulation have a significant positive effect on R&D 
expenditures, but is not significantly related to inventive output (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). Brunnermeier 
and Cohen study how environmental innovations responds to changes in pollution-reduction 
expenditures and the enforcement of environmental regulation, they find that environmental innovation 
responds to increases in pollution abatement expenditures, but increased monitoring and enforcement 
activities related to existing regulations do not provide any additional incentive to innovate 
(Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003). One reason for this is that environmental regulation may have little 
impact on the technological innovation of some firms, but it has a significant impact on technology 
adoption and diffusion (Shao et al., 2020). Gray and Shadbegian (1998) show that environmental 
regulation enables firms to achieve cleaner production standards by purchasing new pollution control 
equipment and production equipment, rather than by engaging in R&D activities and innovation (Gray 
and Shadbegian, 2003). 
2.2. Hypotheses 
According to Porter’s hypothesis, strict and appropriate environmental regulations will force 
firms to carry out green innovation in energy conservation and environmental protection. Subsequently 
a number of scholars have come to conclusions that environmental regulation can drive corporate green 
innovation (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Rehfeld et al., 2007). CSR 
activities encompass corporate social and environmental behavior that goes beyond the legal or 
regulatory requirement of the relevant market and/or economy (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). 
We posit that mandatory CSR disclosure is an environmental regulation policy, so as to expect that 
mandatory CSR disclosure will restrain pollutant emissions and foster green innovation. That is 
because once firms disclose their CSR activities, the government and interest groups may find it easier 
to “shame” polluting firms into reducing their pollutant emissions (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
Specifically, mandatory CSR information disclosure mainly affects green innovation through two 
channels. Firstly, CSR information disclosure can alleviate the agency problem, which arises from the 
separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (managers). Information asymmetry further 
aggravates the agency problem. As a nonfinancial disclosure, mandatory CSR information disclosure 
can alleviate information asymmetry and increase monitoring (Wang et al., 2016). According to the 
career concern model, managers may dislike the risk innovation involves, and increased monitoring 
can improve incentives to innovate (Aghion et al., 2013). Secondly, as a means of environmental 
regulation, CSR information disclosure can stimulate firms’ green innovation. Porter hypothesis 
believes that when firms try to improve the environmental efficiency of resource utilization, innovation 
may occur, which helps improve production processes and product quality. Based on this 
argumentation, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1A. Firms experience an increase in green innovation subsequent to the 
mandatory CSR disclosure.  
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However, there are also some studies indicating that environmental regulation would have adverse 
effects on technological innovations. Gray and Shadbegian (2003) found that environmental investment 
would crowd out productive investment under strict environmental regulations, leading to a decline in 
production technology. Wagner found that the more emphasis on environmental regulations, the less 
innovative patent firms produced (Wagner, 2007). Thus, we propose the opposing hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1B. Firms experience a decrease in green innovation subsequent to the 
mandatory CSR disclosure.  
The Schumpeter hypothesis suggests large firms can produce more innovations than small and 
medium-sized firms. One reason is that larger firms have enough output over which they can apply the 
results, then they can spread the cost of innovation (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). Another reason is that 
small and medium-sized firms face greater financing constraints, that is, small and medium-sized firms 
may not have enough funds for R&D investment, while large firms even can directly use cash flow 
and commercial credit as the main sources of R&D investment (Sasidharan et al., 2015). Thus we 
postulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Large Firms exhibit more increase in green innovation than small and 
medium-sized firms subsequent to the mandatory CSR disclosure. 
In addition, unlike private firms, when required to disclose their CSR activities, state-owned firms 
feel larger pressure to increase their commitment to CSR, so they are more susceptible to the influence of 
policies and tend to carry out more green innovation activities. We hypothesize this prediction as follows: 
Hypothesis 3. State-owned firms exhibit a different increase in green innovation from 
non-state-owned firms subsequent to the mandatory CSR disclosure. 
Furthermore, once the mandatory CSR disclosure comes out, the impact on firms in Pollution-
intensive industries (PIIs) is the largest. Pollution-intensive industries have to disclosure more information 
about the environmental protection and resource conservation. And if the disclosure is not ideal, investors 
will vote with their feet, which will force firms to carry out more innovation activities. Based on this 
argumentation, we form the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. Firms in Pollution-intensive industries (PIIs) are more affected by mandatory 
CSR disclosure than Non- Pollution-intensive industries (NPIIS). 
Finally, we show the influence mechanism of mandatory CSR information disclosure on green 
innovation in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The influence mechanism of mandatory CSR information disclosure on green innovation. 
3. Research design 
3.1. Basic models 
At the end of December 2008, Shanghai Stock Exchange release a notice that require the 
companies issuing foreign shares listed overseas and financial companies shall disclose the report on 
the fulfillment of social responsibility of the company (hereinafter referred to as “social responsibility 
report”) at the same time as the annual report of 2008. And listed companies included in the “Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange 100 index” shall disclose their social responsibility reports in accordance with the 
provisions of the guidelines on social responsibility. Due to this exogenous policy, it is possible to use 
a differences-in-differences (DID) strategy to identify the impact of compulsory CSR information 
disclosure on green innovation: 
𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜௧
ൌ α ൅ β ∙ treat௜ ൅ γ ∙ post௧ ൅ δ ∙ treat௜ ∙ post௧ ൅ λ ∙ controlvariables௜௧ ൅ ε௜௧ (1)
where 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜௧  represents the green innovation;  treat௜  is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the corporate is in experience group, otherwise equals 0; post௧ is a time dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if the year is after 2007, otherwise equals 0. So the coefficient of the interactions δ 
can be used to measure the impact of compulsory CSR information disclosure on green innovation. 
3.2. Data 
This paper mainly collects the data of Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2005 
to 2011. As the mandatory information disclosure policy is released at the end of December 2008, we 
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select the samples three years before 2008 and three years after 2008 respectively. On the one hand 
this sample interval is long enough to form a panel data. On the other hand, other policies implemented 
in this interval may confound the effect when longer interval is included. The financial information of 
listed companies are from China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. To 
ensure the reliability of the results, we conduct the following screening and pretreatments: (1) eliminating 
samples with missing variable data; (2) eliminating special treatment (ST) companies; (3) excluding 
financial companies; (4) deleting firm-year observations with many missing values. 
To obtain the green innovation information, we first collect invention patents by company and 
year from the State Intellectual Property Office in China. Secondly, we identify the green invention 
patents according to the IPC Green Inventory, which is an online tool launched by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). They aim to facilitate searches for patent information 
relating to Environmentally Sound Technologies (ESTs). The inventory classifies green innovation 
into seven categories: transportation, alternative energy production, energy conservation, 
transportation, waste management, agriculture and forestry, and nuclear power generation according 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on climate change. And finally, we count the numbers 
of green invention patents. 
3.3. Variable definition 
3.3.1. Dependent variables 
We define the green innovation by the numbers of green invention patent applications. Different 
from utility model, invention patents have the highest technical content. Therefore, invention patents 
are generally used to measure the degree of technological innovation. 
3.3.2. Key explanatory variables 
As mentioned above, treat௜  and post௧  are both dummy variables. The interaction of treat௜ 
and post௧ is our key explanatory variable, and its coefficient measures the impact of mandatory CSR 
information disclosure on green innovation. 
3.3.3. Control variables 
The models employed in our analyses include a number of firm-level control variables. In order 
to test the “Schumpeterian hypothesis”, we add to variable “Firm size” in our model. In order to test 
the impact of ownership nature on green innovation, we add to dummy variable “State-owned firms 
or not” in our model. In order to test the impact of financial performance, we add to variables 
“Profitability” and “Debt-paying ability”. Also we add to variable “Proportion of the largest 
shareholder” to test the impact of ownership structure on green innovation. Specially, Table 1 shows 
the definition of the main variables, for example, lnasset is the natural log of total assets. largesthold 
is the total percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. isstateown is an indicator denoting 
whether firms are not state-owned firms. 
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Table 1. Definitions of the main variables used in this study. 
Variable Name Symbol Definition 
Green innovation greeninnovation Numbers of green invention patent applications 
Debt-paying ability liability Liabilities/Asset 
Firm size lnasset LN (year-end total assets) 
Proportion of the largest shareholder largesthold Total percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder 
State-owned firms or not isstateown The variable equals 1 if the corporate is state-owned firms, otherwise equals 0 
Proportion of the state shareholder state 
Total percentage of shares owned by the state 
shareholder 
Cashflow cashflow Net increase in cash and cash equivalents 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. The impact of mandatory CSR Disclosure on green innovation 
Firstly, we compare the samples between treat groups with control groups. Table 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics. In our sample, the mean of roa is 0.06 (0.6) for our treat goups and 0.05 (0.09) 
for our control goups. We use the variables (lnasset, largesthold, isstateown) to measure the sizes of 
the firms, the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholder and the nature of the firms 
respectively. All variables in treat groups are close to the control groups. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
 Treat group Control group 
 N mean sd min max N mean sd min max 
roa 1233 0.06 0.6 −0.41 20.79 9966 0.05 0.09 −0.81 2.93 
liability 1233 0.52 0.19 0.01 1 9966 0.47 0.21 0 1 
lnasset 1233 22.62 1.64 16.69 28.28 9966 21.41 1.12 13.08 27.1 
largesthold 1233 40.53 15.68 6.47 100 9966 37.08 15.67 2.2 99 
isstateown 1233 0.8 0.4 0 1 9966 0.53 0.5 0 1 
As Bertrand and Mullainathan point out，the premise for the application of DID model is that the 
treat group and the control group should satisfy the parallel trend hypothesis before being treated (Bertrand 
and Mullainathan 2003). Then the difference between the treat group and the control group can be 
considered as the treatment effect. Therefore we add two variables, year − 3, year − 2, for the pre-period 
and three variables, year + 1, year + 2 and year + 3 for the post-period. We next interact these five variables 
with the dummy variable treat. The results reported in Figure 2 show that the coefficient of (year − 3)*treat 
and (year − 2)*treat and (year + 1)*treat are insignificant and that the coefficient of (year + 2)*treat and 
(year + 3)*treat are significantly positive. It may be due to lag effect that the coefficient of (year + 1)*treat 
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is insignificant. These result support the parallel trend assumption and suggest increased innovation after 
the mandatory CSR information disclosure. Therefore, it is suitable to use DID model to test the impact of 
mandatory CSR information disclosure on green innovation. 
 
Figure 2. Parallel trend test. Note: Vertical bands represent +(1)1.98 times the standard 
error of each point estimate; pre_3, pre_2, post_1, post_2 and post_3 represent year − 3, 
year − 2, year + 1, year + 2 and year + 3 respectively. 
Table 3 reports the DID results of mandatory CSR information disclosure on green innovation. 
Column (1) is the basic model, and column (2) and (3) adds to year dummy variables and other control 
variables, respectively. In column (1)–(3), the coefficient of the interaction between post and treat 
(post*treat) are always significantly positive, which indicates that mandatory CSR information 
disclosures have significant effect on corporate green innovation. On average, after the introduction of 
the policy, the firms in the list generate 2.193–2.244 more green invention patents than those not in 
the list. The results support the hypothesis 1A, namely firms experience an increase in green innovation 
subsequent to the mandatory CSR disclosure. But we cannot determine which channel (alleviate the 
information asymmetry or environmental regulation) plays a role in the process. 
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Table 3. The impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on green innovation. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
post*treat 2.215*** 2.244*** 2.193*** 
 (0.480) (0.480) (0.479) 
post 0.300** 0.680*** −1.432 
 (0.145) (0.248) (1.146) 
treat −2.420*** −2.077*** −2.011*** 
 (0.600) (0.611) (0.610) 
lnasset   0.155 
   (0.179) 
largesthold   0.006 
   (0.012) 
state   −0.019*** 
   (0.005) 
cashflow   0.000*** 
   (0.000) 
age   0.001 
   (0.001) 
_cons 0.478*** 0.408** −4.991 
 (0.117) (0.195) (3.796) 
Year FE Not Included Included Included 
N 9732 9732 9725 
R2 0.004 0.006 0.015 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
4.2. The heterogeneous impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on green innovation 
In order to prove the hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3, we further distinguishes the firms into 
different groups according to the ownership nature and the size of firms, and tests the impact of 
mandatory CSR information disclosure on green innovation. Table 4 reports the results. In column 1 
and column 2, we show the results of state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms respectively. In 
column 3 and column 4, we show the results of the small and medium firms and large firms 
respectively (According to the median size of e firms, firms are divided into large firms group and 
small and medium-sized firms group). The coefficient of the interaction between post and treat is 
significantly positive in the sample of state-owned firms, but it is not significant in non-state-owned 
firms, which indicates that mandatory CSR information disclosure has a positive effect on state-owned 
firms. It supports the hypothesis 3, which assumes state-owned firms exhibit a different increase in 
green innovation from non-state-owned firms subsequent to the mandatory CSR disclosure. This may 
be due to the fact that state-owned firms feel more pressure to increase their commitment to CSR. 
Compared with small and medium-size firms, the coefficient of the interaction is significant and 
positive in large firms. It supports the hypothesis 2, which assumes large firms exhibit more increase 
in green innovation than small and medium-sized firms subsequent to the mandatory CSR disclosure. 
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And the Schumpeterian hypothesis holds. This may be due to the fact that larger firms have enough 
output to spread the cost of innovation or the fact that large firms have enough funds for R&D 
investment compared with small and medium-sized firms. 
Also, in order to test hypothesis 4. First, we draw on the definitions of Pollution-intensive industries 
(PIIs) to divide different industries. According to Liu et al., based on the median of the emission intensity 
the industries are divided into Pollution-intensive industries (PIIs) and non-Pollution-intensive industries 
(NPIIs), which is reported in Table 5, and the division standard of industrial sectors is in accordance with 
“China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook” (Liu et al., 2016). Traditional manufacturing industries 
such as Manufacture of paper and paper products, Manufacture of textiles, Beverage manufacturing and 
Production and supply of gas are included into the Pollution-intensive industries. Then we make 
regression based on these two groups of samples, whose results are shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 
4. In column 5, the coefficient of the interaction is significant at the 1% level, while in column 6, the 
coefficient is not significant. This shows that in the pollution intensive industries, the mandatory 
information disclosure policy can promote the innovation behavior of firms. On average, after the 
introduction of the policy, the number of green invention patent applications of firms in the list is 6.98 
more than those if not in the list. 
Table 4. The heterogeneous impact of mandatory CSR disclosure. 
 SOE NSE SMEs Large PIIs NPIIs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
post*treat 2.77*** −0.19 −0.19 3.12*** 3.14*** −0.26 
 (0.64) (0.81) (0.59) (0.75) (0.61) (0.66) 
post −2.24 0.23 −0.00 −2.18 −1.96 −0.07 
 (1.96) (1.05) (1.00) (2.06) (1.41) (1.73) 
treat −2.27*** −0.12 0.13 −2.75*** −2.94*** 0.27 
 (0.82) (0.94) (0.73) (0.95) (0.77) (0.85) 
lnasset 0.09 0.31*   0.11 0.42 
 (0.30) (0.19)   (0.21) (0.31) 
largesthold 0.00 −0.02 −0.01 0.02 0.02 −0.02 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
cashflow 0.00*** −0.00 −0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** −0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
age 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
state   0.00 −0.03*** −0.03***  
   (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)  
_cons  −6.56 −5.15 0.39 −3.55 −5.12 0.00 
 (6.68) (3.65) (1.58) (3.59) (4.50) (0.01) 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 5597 4128 4746 4979 2464 7261 
R2 0.017 0.005 0.003 0.022 0.022 0.006 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5. The definition of pollution-intensive industries. 
Pollution-intensive industries 
Manufacture of paper and paper products Manufacture of textiles 
Beverage manufacturing Production and supply of gas 
Processing of food from agricultural products Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 
Manufacture of chemical fibers Production and supply of electric power and heat power 
Foodstuff manufacturing Petroleum processing, coking, and nuclear fuel processing 
Manufacture of raw chemical materials and chemical 
products Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals 
Production and supply of water Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 
Note: Definitions of PIIs come from the results of Liu et al. (2016). 
5. Robust tests 
5.1. PSM-DID method 
Furthermore, we use the propensity score matching and difference-in-difference (PSM-DID) 
method to do the robust tests. Before using propensity score matching method, the two tests (balance 
assumption and common support assumption) are required. On the one hand, the balance assumption 
(also called ignorability or selection on observables) require the two groups in observables should be 
as similar as possible so that the possibility of firms entering the control group was similar to the treat 
group. Therefore, firstly we select the variables (roa, liability and whether state-owned firms) as the 
covariant and use logit model to compute the propensity score. Table 6 shows the results of balance 
test. In this table, the t-test results show that, there are significant differences between the two groups 
in several variables (roa, liability and whether state-owned firms) before matching. But after matching, 
the significance decreases obviously. There is no significant difference between the two groups in 
terms of roa, liability and whether state-owned firms. Moreover, the average deviation between the 
control group and the processing group is within 5%, and the deviation reduction range is more than 
70%. This shows that the balance hypothesis is satisfied. On the other hand, the common support 
hypothesis requires the propensity scores of treat group and control group have common support. 
Figure 3 shows that before matching, the kernel density of the control group and the treat group are 
significant different. But after matching the kernel density of the two groups are very close, which 
indicates that after matching, the two groups have common support (meet the common support 
hypothesis). In addition, it indicates that the characteristics of the variables in the two groups are 
similar, after matching. 
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Table 6. Balance test. 
Variable         Unmatched Mean   % reduct t−test V(T)/ 
 Matched Treated Control %bias bias t        p > t V(C) 
roa                 U 0.06177   0.04603 3.7   2.44   0.015 47.62* 
  M 0.06177   0.04675 3.5 4.6 0.88   0.380 53.52* 
lnasset             U 22.616    21.406 86   33.66  0.000 2.15* 
  M 22.616    22.623 −0.5 99.4 −0.10  0.918 1.01 
largestholder    U 40.529    37.077 22   7.29   0.000 1 
  M 40.529    40.178 2.2 89.8 0.53   0.599 0.81* 
isstateown         U 0.79968   0.5294 59.7   18.30  0.000  
  M 0.79968   0.79157 1.8 97 0.50   0.618  
 
Figure 3. The kernel density of the treat and control group before and after matching. 
Table 7 reports the descriptive Statistics of the sample after the matching. The treat groups are 
the same as mentioned before (Table 2), while the control groups are composed of the PSM samples. 
After matching, the differences between treat groups and control groups are narrowed to a comparable 
range, for example, the mean of liability with control groups is 0.52, which is the same as treat groups.  
Table 7. Descriptive statistics, PSM samples. 
 treat control 
 N mean sd min max N mean sd min max 
roa 1233 0.06 0.6 −0.41 20.79 2484 0.05 0.09 −0.81 1.76 
liability 1233 0.52 0.19 0.01 1 2484 0.52 0.2 0.02 1 
lnasset 1233 22.62 1.64 16.69 28.28 2484 22.05 1.28 15.47 27.1 
largesthold 1233 40.53 15.68 6.47 100 2484 38.53 16.57 2.2 95 
isstateown 1233 0.8 0.4 0 1 2484 0.74 0.44 0 1 
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Then based on the PSM samples, we again utilize the DID model to test the hypothesis 1. Table 
8 reports the results of PSM-DID method. Column (1) is the basic model, and column (2) adds to the 
year dummy variables. The results show that the coefficient of the interactions are both significant and 
positive, which suggest that firms generate 1.729–1.907 more green invention patents on average after 
the mandatory CSR information disclosure.  
Table 8. The impact of mandatory CSR disclosure, PSM sample. 
 (1) (2) 
post*treat 1.729* 1.907** 
 (0.891) (0.893) 
post 0.463 1.583* 
 (0.530) (0.845) 
treat −2.005* −0.938 
 (1.113) (1.170) 
_cons 1.029** 0.637 
 (0.448) (0.694) 
Year FE Not Included Included 
N 3717 3717 
R2 0.004 0.009 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
5.2. Placebo effect 
In Table 9, we use two placebo tests to support the results. First, we assign 2007 as a pseudo 
mandatory disclosure adoption year, classifying our firm-year observations as post-period if the year 
falls in 2007. We assume that the coefficient should be significant if there were other factors which 
affected the green innovation. But the fact is that the coefficient of the interaction reported in column 
(1) is not significant again, which proves that there is no firm green innovation subsequent to the 
pseudo mandatory disclosure adoption year.  
Then, we repeat our analysis after deleting 2008 from our sample to do another robustness test. 
As we understand, if the mandatory information disclosure has effect on green innovation, deleting the 
sample of one year should not change the results. The results reported in column (2) show that the 
coefficient on the interaction term post*treat continues to be significantly positive.  
These results support the parallel trend assumption. They also suggest that our observed increase 
in firm green innovation for our treatment firms occurs after the disclosure mandate become effective. 
Taken together, the results suggest that mandatory CSR disclosure can foster firm green innovation. 
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Table 9. Additional robustness tests with the dependent variable being green innovation. 
 Placebo test Deleting 2008 
(1) (2) 
post*treat −0.0398 2.745*** 
 (0.0704) (0.466) 
post 0.0557 0.365 
 (0.0357) (0.282) 
treat 0.236** −2.713*** 
 (0.0925) (0.669) 
roa −0.0592 −0.161 
 (0.170) (0.966) 
lnasset 0.0459 0.205 
 (0.0396) (0.164) 
largesthold 0.000313 −0.00251 
 (0.00204) (0.0108) 
Year FE Included Included 
_cons −0.768 −3.769 
 (0.828) (3.390) 
N 5484 9710 
R2 0.006 0.008 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
5.3. Other control variables 
Furthermore, we also add to other control variables. According to the research of Aghion et al. (2013), 
greater institutional ownership can promote corporate innovation, we add to variable “Proportion of shares 
owned by institutional investors” to test the impact of institutional investors. In order to test the impact of 
ownership structure, we also add to variable “Proportion of the top ten largest shareholder”. In order to test 
the impact of corporate governance structure, we add to variable “Separation degree between chairman and 
CEO”. Specially, table 10 shows the definition of the other control variables, for example, ins is defined as 
the percentage of shares owned by all kinds of institutional investors. separation is defined as a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if chairman and CEO are the same person, otherwise equals 0.  
Table 10. Definitions of other control variables used in this study. 
Variable Name Symbol Definition 
Proportion of shares owned by institutional investors ins Total percentage of shares owned by all kinds of institutional investors 
Separation degree between chairman and CEO separation A dummy variable which equals 1 if chairman and CEO are the same person, otherwise equals 0 
Proportion of the top ten largest shareholder topten Total percentage of shares owned by the top ten largest shareholder 
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Table 11 show the results of additional robustness tests with other control variables. In column 
(1), the coefficient of the interaction is still significant and positive. On average, after the introduction 
of the policy, the firms in the list generate 2.341 more green invention patents than those if not in the 
list. In column (2)–(5), we can still conclude that state-owned firms and large firms are more sensitive 
to the mandatory information disclosure policy, and that they generate more invention patents than did 
they if not in the list. 
Table 11. Additional robustness tests with the dependent variable being green innovation. 
 All SOE NSE Large SMEs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
post*treat 2.341*** 2.845*** −0.170 3.169*** −0.154 
 (0.504) (0.680) (0.820) (0.809) (0.615) 
post 0.064 0.007 0.116 0.354 0.067 
 (0.190) (0.302) (0.194) (0.337) (0.146) 
treat −2.471*** −2.930*** −0.085 −3.587*** 0.151 
 (0.626) (0.852) (0.942) (0.985) (0.747) 
roa 0.067 −0.048 0.252 −0.167 0.045 
 (1.344) (2.400) (1.201) (3.481) (0.937) 
liability 0.057 −0.597 0.639 0.776 0.264 
 (0.804) (1.391) (0.775) (1.829) (0.646) 
largesthold −0.001 0.006 −0.008 0.003 0.004 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.017) (0.031) (0.014) 
topten −0.009 −0.011 −0.011 −0.005 −0.012 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.012) (0.028) (0.011) 
lnasset 0.368** 0.589* 0.173   
 (0.176) (0.307) (0.174)   
isstateown 0.137   0.583 0.099 
 (0.468)   (1.102) (0.352) 
ins 0.354 0.270 0.763 0.667 0.863 
 (0.603) (0.913) (0.668) (1.163) (0.545) 
seperation −0.001 −0.006 −0.000 −0.003 0.003 
 (0.019) (0.034) (0.020) (0.039) (0.016) 
_cons −6.913* −11.289* −2.849 0.232 0.474 
 (3.645) (6.331) (3.631) (1.839) (0.615) 
Year FE included included included included included 
N 9331 5254 4077 4665 4666 
R2 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.002 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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6. Conclusions 
Since the Berle-Dodd debate, more and more scholars pay attention to CSR. The initial research 
focuses on the relationship between CSR and firm value, and the results are inconclusive. CSR can 
reduce firm’s financing cost, but also spends too much resources on unproductive activities. Later 
research also begins to focus on CSR from the perspective of stakeholders, for example the impact of 
CSR on environmental performance, the indirect effect of CSR on firm value through innovation. And 
as people pay more attention to information disclosure, many countries begin to implement mandatory 
CSR information disclosure, which require firms to issue stand-alone CSR reports along with the 
annual report. The same is true of China. Although the original intention of policy makers is good, but 
frankly the effectiveness of policies needs to be judged through research. Unfortunately, few scholars 
have done research. Under this incentive, a quasi-natural experiment is designed in this paper to study 
the impact of mandatory CSR on green innovation.  
The DID results show that mandatory CSR information disclosure can indeed promote firms’ green 
innovation. On average, after the introduction of the policy, the firms in the list generate 1.912–1.956 more 
green invention patents than those if not in the list. Moreover, the influence is heterogeneous among 
different types of firms. Larger firms, state-owned firms and firms in pollution-intensive industries are 
more likely to be affected by mandatory disclosure. And the results are robust to the different samples or 
methods. In sum, our findings support the “Porter Hypothesis” that the environmental regulation could 
promote corporate green innovation. Also, our findings show that state-owned firms and larger firms are 
more sensitive to policy, thus are more influenced by the environmental regulation. 
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